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Linguistic or conceptual relativity has been associated with certain theses in the philosophy of social sciences, 
playing a key role, in particular, in earlier philosophical and methodological discussions of social and cultural 
anthropology. This kind of linguistic or cognitive relativism and, in general, the relation between language and 
thought or between linguistic terms and conceptual categories, which was seen as indispensable to social 
inquiry by antipositivist or antiscientist circles in the philosophy of social sciences, has also been associated 
with specific readings of Ludwig Wittgenstein's language-games and forms of life. 
This entry critically reviews two major instances of this alleged linguistic/conceptual relativism and dispels the 
resultant erroneous assumptions about relativism in the social sciences that were once dominant in the phi-
losophy of social sciences. 
Origins 
It is widely assumed that the mid 20th century saw the emergence of two powerful relativist theories that 
posed a significant threat to the prospects of the social sciences. This assumption underpins the further wide-
ly held assumption that these challenges have been rebutted. These assumptions are only half true. 
One of the two theories in question was advanced by the American linguist Benjamin Whorf (1897–1941), 
building on the work of his teacher, the anthropologist-linguist Edward Sapir, and this theory is usually referred 
to as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. The second figure often identified as having advanced a relativist theory is 
the British philosopher Peter Winch (1926–1997), in his book The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to 
Philosophy (hereafter, ISS), a book that is informed by the approach to philosophy pioneered by Wittgenstein. 
While Whorf avowedly advanced a theory of linguistic relativism, Winch sought to advance no theses, and, 
moreover, his writings neither propound nor endorse relativism. 
In the following sections, we will first look at the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis and assess some criticisms of that 
theory. We will then progress to Winch's writings, clarifying his claims about the nature of social studies. We 
will see that far from endorsing or providing a variant of Whorf's thesis, Winch actually provides one with the 
resources for a critique of Whorf. 
The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis and Linguistic Relativism 
Whorf's theory of linguistic relativism is founded on his claim that speakers of different natural languages, or 
more precisely natural languages belonging to different families, operate according to different grammatical 
rules and that these different grammars shape the thoughts of the native speakers of that language. What 
follows from such a claim is that the same physical evidence does not necessarily force upon a perceiver 
the same picture of the universe, for the picture is formed by the grammar of the language. Therefore, differ-
ent languages are said to entail different pictures of the universe irrespective of those pictures' basis in the 
same physical data. Grammar, for Whorf, is the “shaper of ideas” and that which provides “thought materials.” 
Therefore, Whorf hypothesizes that the nature of reality is relative to the grammar of a natural language. 
While Whorf's theory has been subjected to a number of criticisms, some miss their target by misunderstand-
ing the precise nature of the theory. For example, some took Whorf to be making a point about different vocab-
ularies: for example, that language A contains numerous words for phenomenon X, for which only one word 
exists in language B. This was not Whorf's claim and is of little interest to him. Others have criticized Whorf's 
foundational claim that different natural languages, particularly those belonging to different language families, 
such as Indo-European and non–Indo-European, have different grammars. This is challenged by those who 
subscribe to Noam Chomsky's linguistic theory, wherein Chomsky advances the theory of universal grammar. 
Such critics reject Whorf's relativism by contesting the grammatical pluralism on which his relativism is found-
ed. If Chomsky's theory is true, then this does indeed seem to undermine Whorf's hypothesis. However, one 
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does not have to subscribe to Chomsky's theory of generative grammar and its basis in a theory of an in-
nate universal grammar to undermine Whorf's relativism. Indeed, one might even believe that one can defend 
Whorf's theory against a Chomskyan criticism by, for example, questioning the validity of Chomsky's theories. 
However, there is another, alternative, way to undermine Whorf's thesis without appealing to or subscribing to 
Chomsky's theories; here, Whorf's argument is identified as residing not in the claim that different grammars 
exist in different natural languages but rather in a set of unacknowledged philosophical assumptions that are 
operative in Whorf's hypothesis. This criticism of Whorf brings to the fore the philosophical assumptions un-
derlying Whorf's claim that grammatical differences entail different metaphysics. In other words, rather than 
focusing on his grammatical pluralism, one might focus on Whorf's claim that one can read off a metaphysics 
from the grammar of a language. For one thing of note, all too often overlooked in discussions of Whorf's 
theory, is that his relativism is not entailed by his observations about the grammar of different languages; nor 
did Whorf claim it to be so. There is, rather, a philosophical argument operative in Whorf's thesis, which is 
assessable independently of his grammatical pluralism. A criticism addressed to this aspect of Whorf's thesis 
is one that seeks to show that Whorf's thesis lacks intelligibility. John W. Cook's critique is an exemplar of this 
approach. 
On close examination, Whorf's claim that different metaphysics can be read off from different grammars can 
be shown to fall short of his aims, and this can be seen by examining his remarks about his own language: 
English. A little like the anthropologist who writes of the primitive superstitions of the tribe he is studying, while 
it remains literally unremarkable to him that he then prays before dinner and kisses a photograph of a loved 
one before going to sleep for the night, Whorf's writings about the metaphysics he claims to read off Hopi 
grammar are accompanied by a distinctly superficial depiction of the grammar of his own language. His argu-
ments about grammatical categories determining the metaphysics of the speakers of the language are conse-
quent on his being led astray by the surface grammar of his own language, because where Whorf took himself 
to be identifying a metaphysics that can be read off the grammar of English (and, when he turned to study 
that, Hopi), he was rather reading into English a metaphysics that owed much to his own preexisting, underly-
ing metaphysical assumptions about English grammar. To paraphrase John W. Cook, Whorf was not reading 
off a metaphysics from the grammar of English but rather reading into English a metaphysics not there. For 
example, Whorf employs the example of the concept of “time” in support of his claim that metaphysics is read 
off grammar, but his assumptions about the metaphysics of time are simply read off his observation that in 
English “time” is a noun, and he seems to assume that nouns must correspond to something. Whorf is there-
fore being led astray by the surface (superficial) grammar of “time.” When he then takes himself to have read 
off a metaphysics of time as being composed of “moments,” “time slices,” or “time flows,” he is actually being 
led astray by his unacknowledged assumption that “time” as a noun in English must correspond to something. 
To summarize, the real problem faced by someone who is persuaded by the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is not 
that it is based on a now unfashionable theory of grammar, in light of the prominence attained by Chomsky's 
work. Rather, the real problem is that what had appeared to many (including Whorf) as a thesis founded up-
on, if not logically forced upon one by, the results of empirical studies of the grammar of natural languages is 
actually a set of claims emerging from the observer, such as Whorf, who is in the grip of an unacknowledged 
picture of grammar that leads him to first misrepresent his own language and then proceed to misrepresent 
those he is studying. 
Peter Winch and Relativism as One Consequence of Scientism 
It is widely assumed that Peter Winch, at least implicitly, endorsed some version of Whorf's theory in his ISS. 
It is also widely assumed that Winch propounded a theory of cultural relativism, based on his observations 
about grammar and rules. Both these assumptions are incorrect. 
Winch claimed that social studies should be seen as philosophy. As he put the matter early in his book, where 
science is concerned with the explanation of particular real things and processes, the philosopher is con-
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cerned with the nature of reality in general—what counts as “real” or what we mean by “real.” On this view, 
social studies are better understood as philosophy because their questions have central to them discussions 
about the meaning of that which is under study (e.g., “happiness,” which has been the subject of much re-
cent putatively empirical study). Specific normative questions such as “Should the state promote happiness 
through policy?” or questions demanding answers in the form of social facts such as “Is Britain happier than 
Norway?” or “Does socialism produce greater happiness than neoliberalism?” are parasitic upon the general 
question about the nature of happiness. The social scientist must concern herself with the question of what 
we take happiness to be or, put another way, what counts for us as happiness: Is it a psychological state, and 
if so, of what sort? Is it related to flourishing as a member of a species with a particular set of needs? Is a hap-
py life necessarily a good life? Can happiness that is gained through the suffering of others be genuine hap-
piness? Do we accept the drug addict's claim to be blissfully happy, following a fix, as genuine happiness? Is 
there a difference between genuine and subjective/apparent/false/synthetic happiness? And if there is, what 
are our grounds for saying so, and what are our criteria for “genuine happiness”? Are there degrees of hap-
piness, and if so, how might these be measured? These are unavoidable questions, and they are questions 
that cannot be answered by empirical study or causal explanation. The point is that any attempt at empirical 
enquiry into happiness cannot bypass the philosophical discussion as to the general nature of happiness. 
Winch's critique of certain assumptions in the social sciences is rich and multilayered; it has deep ethical di-
mensions that became increasingly prominent in his later post-ISS writings. Actions are meaningful, and their 
meaning is inextricably linked to the context and occasion of action. Believing that meaning can be under-
stood through identification of an action's cause is to misunderstand the nature of action and meaning. So if 
one's conception of science demands that explanations are stated in the form of lawlike generalizations with 
predictive power, then that demands a noncontextual identification of act tokens, whereby the role of context 
in the meaning of an action (a specific act token) can be foregone. However, the nature of action is such 
that the context—the social situation—is intrinsic to its identity. Moreover, an attempt to deny or bypass the 
meaningful nature of action leads us to a misrepresentation of not only the actions of those whom the social 
scientist claims to be explaining but of ourselves too, for first and foremost the social scientist is an ordinary 
social actor. The act of understanding others involves understanding ourselves, and this is a point Winch in-
creasingly sought to emphasize and one that might easily have been directed at Whorf. Failure to understand 
others through a misunderstanding of the meaningful nature of action results in failure to understand one-
self in a manner that one might depict as bad faith. Furthermore, the observation that actions are meaningful 
leads to the recognition of them as open textured. Should one concede that lawlike generalizations might be 
possible for some general categories of action, it would still not be possible to rely on those generalizations 
having nonplatitudinous predictive worth because of their open texture. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, Whorf sought to advance a relativist hypothesis, and we have seen that this emerged from his 
own underlying philosophical assumptions, which ultimately meant that he failed to achieve his goal. Winch 
was making specific observations about the nature of the questions and problems that are dealt with in so-
cial studies and how being in thrall to particular pictures of what counts as a valid form of explanation can 
impair our understanding of those questions and problems. For Winch, arguments for theories of cultural or 
linguistic relativism ultimately lack intelligibility, and they can usually be shown to emerge from a failure of 
self-understanding: a sort of bad faith or intellectual hubris. For Winch, relativism is usually a consequence of 
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• Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis 
• happiness 
• linguistic theory 




• Causes Versus Reasons in Action Explanation 
• Language and Society 
• Language-Games and Forms of Life 
• Relativisms and Their Ontologies 
• Rule Following 
• Social Anthropology 
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